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Abstract
Modelling oligopoly in general equilibrium is about understanding the aggregate ef-
fects of the strategic behavior that nonatomistic agents may exhibit in their markets.
Real-world economies appear to be characterized by (monopoly) power-endowed agents
behaving strategically - namely, firms and unions. By abstracting from this behavior, we
risk missing some important features of the macroeconomy. We develop a general equi-
librium model of unionized oligopoly aimed at addressing this point. We evaluate the
macroeconomic eﬀects of supply-side shocks under alternative product and labor market
structures. In addition, the micro foundations of the model capture an alternative chan-
nel for the development of strategic interactions among firms, unions and the monetary
authority. This channel creates a transmission mechanism for real eﬀects of monetary
policy-related shocks, which we investigate. Finally, in the light of the predictions of the
model, we discuss macroecomic performance in Continental Europe over the 1990s.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays, it is widely accepted that imperfect competition constitutes an important pil-
lar for understanding macroeconomic phenomena. Existing models within the literature of
imperfectly competitive macroeconomics have commonly used the monopolistically competi-
tive general equilibrium framework developed by Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987].1 A relatively
unexplored path within this literature relates to the functioning of the oligopolistically com-
petitive and unionized economy. A type of ‘theoretical’ economy, one might argue, that closely
describes the actual structure of many economies in the industrial world. This observation jus-
tifies the search for alternative routes to modelling the macroeconomy. The aim is to achieve
a better understanding of the macroeconomic eﬀects of the (optimal) strategic behavior that
characterizes price (quantity)-setting and wage-setting agents operating in oligopolistic sectors.
This paper integrates diﬀerent aspects of oligopoly theory and labor theory, traditionally lim-
ited to partial equilibrium analysis, into a general equilibrium framework. Specifically, imperfect
competition emerges from two sources: (i) firms interact within diﬀerentiated oligopolies; (ii)
the labor force is unionized. Ultimately, the labor market is the recipient of the eﬀects of these
sources of imperfection, where oligopolistic competition locates labor demand schedules and
unionization controls the eﬀective supply of labor.
In Sections 2 and 3, we develop a model of unionized oligopoly in general equilibrium. We
assume that the economy is composed of a large number of symmetric oligopolies. In each
oligopoly, firms produce diﬀerentiated goods. Marginal costs are endogenous and entirely de-
termined by the wage rate. Firms cooperatively choose to compete in either prices (Bertrand
1 Blanchard and Kiyotaki’s [1987] general equilibrium model is based on monopolistic competition, à
la Dixit-Stiglitz, in goods and labor markets. This implies isoelastic product demand functions and
constant markups. Their framework was not the first attempt to model imperfect competition at
the macroeconomic level (see, for example, earlier work in Hart [1982] or, for a survey, see Dixon
and Rankin [1995]).
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competition) or quantities (Cournot competition). Wage formation occurs in a number of
independent and simultaneous right-to-manage negotiations. The model is solved for two al-
ternative degrees of centralization of the wage-setting process: industry-wide centralization
(sectoral union-employers’ confederation bargain) and decentralization (union-firm bargain),
where the competitive labor supply produces the benchmark outcome.
In this theoretical framework, we explore how macroeconomic variables vary with alternative
specifications governing product and labor markets. Much of existing literature in oligopoly
theory has placed emphasis on the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand partial equilibrium
outcomes (see, for example, Singh and Vives [1984], Vives [1985], Qiu [1997], Dastidar [1997],
Häckner [2003], and Correa López and Naylor [forth.]). However, to the best of our knowledge,
none of the comparisons carried out in the aforementioned literature has been taken to the gen-
eral equilibrium level. One of the obvious reasons is the diﬃculty of finding suitable underlying
preferences to embed oligopoly in a secure general equilibrium foundation (for a discussion,
see Neary [2003b]). Section 3 aims to fill this gap in the literature by comparing Cournot and
Bertrand general equilibrium outcomes, in the context of diﬀerentiated goods and endogenous
labor costs. Furthermore, we assess how macroeconomic variables change in response to certain
supply-side shocks captured by the model, such as a shock to union bargaining power. By doing
so, we address the recent literature on the macroeconomic eﬀects of deregulating product and
labor markets (see, for example, Blanchard and Giavazzi [2003]).
The model produces a wide variety of results. Some of them are standard to the literature
of imperfectly competitive macroeconomics - namely, the ineﬃciency of the oligopolistically
competitive equilibrium and money neutrality. Other results include: the positive output (and
employment) eﬀect of moving from quantity-setting to price-setting competition, and the find-
ing that unionization may produce the competitive outcome in the labor market. The latter
implies that there is a threshold value of union bargaining power at which workers are indiﬀer-
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ent between union wage coverage and the outcome produced by the competitive labor supply.
The exact threshold value of union power depends upon product market characteristics. Inter-
estingly, we also find that perfect competition in the labor market does not always yield higher
equilibrium employment compared to imperfect competition - that is, equilibrium employment
under Bertrand in the presence of unions can exceed equilibrium employment under Cournot
in a perfectly competitive labor market. The latter seems to give support to the notion - as
in Blanchard and Giavazzi [2003] - that deregulation should start from the product market.
To the extent that in the real world the outcome of the wage negotiation is located on the
labor demand schedule, a by-product of deregulating the product market is a more competitive
outcome in the labor market.
Let us emphasize that the models developed by Hart [1982] and Blanchard and Kiyotaki
[1987] have already captured the ineﬃciency of the imperfectly competitive equilibrium. In
a monopolistically competitive economy, Blanchard and Kiyotaki [1987] show that such ineﬃ-
ciency is caused by an aggregate demand externality. On the other hand, Soskice [2000] outlines
that an ineﬃcient equilibrium in the labor market is the result of a prisoners’ dilemma type
of outcome that may be present in unionized economies. An alternative recent approach to
formalize oligopoly in general equilibrium can be found in Neary [2003a, 2003b].
The theoretical setting introduced in this paper adopts the ‘extended linear-homothetic’
preferences to model consumer’s choice over specific goods. The micro foundations that the
‘extended linear-homothetic’ preferences provide, allow us to work with product demand func-
tions that exhibit the following properties: (i) (perceived) linearity; (ii) variable elasticity; and
(iii) cut axes. These properties open the possibility of embedding oligopoly in a tractable gen-
eral equilibrium framework. From a labor theory perspective, this approach is able to provide
a formalization of the macroeconomic outcomes of the right-to-manage model. Also, it opens
up a new route to model the strategic interactions that may take place among firms, unions
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and the central bank.
To explore this route, Section 4 extends the basic closed-economy model, where we allow for
strategic interactions between the monetary authority and price-setting firms. We capture a
transmission mechanism for the existence of real eﬀects of monetary policy-related shocks. This
transmission mechanism operates via sectoral price indices. In particular, we argue that, as long
as firms and unions internalize the sectoral price eﬀects of their individual pricing strategies and
as long as the monetary authority monitors sectoral price indices in order to set money supply
changes, real eﬀects may be expected from a change in either the type of institution conducting
monetary policy - a domestic central bank vis-à-vis a (monetary) union-wide central bank - or
the specific monetary rule it adheres to - from full tightening to full accommodation.
Finally, we apply the model to address a topical issue. Thus, Section 5 informally discusses
the predictions of the model in terms of the (joint) evolution of the labor share and of the
unemployment rate in Continental Europe over the 1990s. We point to the roles that the
degree of product substitutability, the type of monetary institution, and the character of the
monetary policy rule may have in explaining macroeconomic evolutions. Section 6 concludes
by outlining the main implications of this approach, and by pointing out directions for further
research.
2. A General Equilibrium Model with Money
2.1. Description of the Economy
The economy consists of K sectors (k = 1, ...,K) with n firms (i = 1, ..., n) in each, where
K is large and n ≥ 2. Hence, Fik denotes firm i of sector k producing good xik. We assume
that goods across sectors are independent and goods produced within a sector are substitutes.
Sectors are assumed to be symmetric. Firms within a sector exhibit the following short-run
technology: xik = lik. Firms within sectors are assumed to be symmetric.
There is a large number of identical consumers in the economy. Each consumer demands
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goods from each sector and owns a fraction of every firm in the economy. Workers are identical
and evenly distributed across sectors. Workers in each sector are fully unionized and divided
evenly into n unions, where Uik denotes union i of sector k. Unions are firm-specific. Hence,
Uik receives demand for labor from firm Fik and controls the supply of labor to Fik. Labor is
not mobile from union to union: neither to a union of the same sector nor to a union of any
other sector.
Overall, we can talk about consumer-workers. Therefore, givenK large, the assumption that
each consumer-worker consumes goods from all sectors implies that a firm cannot significantly
influence the income of its consumers, hence firms take income as given. The underlying
assumptions of the model imply that economic agents take aggregate income and aggregate
price as given when making their sectoral strategic decisions.2
2.2. The Model
The representative consumer-worker s derives utility from consumption of goods and ac-
cumulation of real money balances, and disutility from work. We model consumer choice as
occurring in two sequential steps. Firstly, individual s allocates income between consumption
and money holdings. Secondly, individual s allocates consumption across specific goods. The
individual delegates its labor supply decision to the union.
Since preferences are homothetic over consumption and real money balances, we can extrap-
olate and deal with the aggregated individual, who solves the following optimization problem:
Max
{X,M}
1
cc(1− c)1−c X
c
µ
M
P
¶1−c
− ρNe, (1)
s.t. PX +M = I
2 The assumptions specified above follow, to a large extent, the Hartian tradition. Hence, from
the point of view of consumer-workers, the beneficial eﬀect derived from a wage increase exceeds
any adverse eﬀect in the form of a higher output price or lower profit. Correspondingly, from the point of
view of shareholders, the beneficial eﬀect of any profit increase exceeds any adverse eﬀect yielded
by a higher output price. The dominance of those beneficial eﬀects are due to how consumption and
shareholding of consumer-workers are spread among the K sectors of the economy. Additionally,
they justify the fact that firms maximize profits and unions care about total wage receipts.
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where, in utility, X is total quantity demanded of the nK goods,M are nominal money balances
held by individuals, P is an aggregate price associated with consumption, and parameter c :
0 < c < 1 weights consumption and real money balances in utility. The term ρNe captures
the disutility from supplying N units of labor (e.g. hours), where N ≤ T and T is the total
number of labor units available, ρ : ρ > 0 parameterizes marginal disutility from work, and
e − 1 captures the elasticity of marginal disutility with respect to work, where e ≥ 1. In the
budget constraint, PX is aggregate nominal expenditure on the nK goods, and I is nominal
income where: I = WL + Ω +Ms, hence I is the sum of total rents from labor, WL, total
profits, Ω, and the initial level of nominal money balances, Ms. Following the assumptions of
the model, the individual takes P and I as exogenously given. The solution to (1) constitutes
the basic macroeconomic framework, where PX = Y = cI and M = (1 − c) I. Thus, the
income-expenditure identities yield: Y = (c/(1− c))Ms.3
In the second step, the aggregated individual optimally allocates its consumption budget cI
across the nK goods produced in the economy, such that PX = Y = cI must hold. In order
to solve for the optimal allocation of nominal expenditure, we model consumer choice by using
the ‘extended linear-homothetic’ preferences.4
The aggregated individual’s expenditure function is described by: E(p, u) = b(p)u, where
p ∈ <nK+ is the price vector of the nK goods. The unit cost function b(p) : <nK+ −→ <+ takes
the following form:
b(p) = (1− δ)µ+ δΨ+ γ [µ− π] , (2)
where δ : δ ∈ (0, 1] and γ : γ > 0 are parameters of the model. Function b(p) is composed of
3 Notice that the utility function in (1) is similar to the one we find in Blanchard and Kiyotaki
[1987] (the diﬀerence being thatX is not a Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution function of the nK goods
produced in the economy).
4 ‘Extended linear-homothetic’ preferences are developed next. The preferences make use of the ex-
penditure function approach. More particularly, they are an extended version of the ‘linear-homothetic’
preferences introduced in Datta and Dixon [2000].
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the following price indices:
µ =
KP
k=1
nP
i=1
pik
nK ;Ψ =
KP
k=1
ψk
K ;ψk =


2
nP
i=1
nP
j=1
i<j
pik pjk
n(n− 1)


1
2
;π =


KP
k=1
nP
i=1
p2ik
nK


1
2
; (3)
µ is the arithmetic average of individual prices, Ψ is the arithmetic average of sectoral-specific
price indices, where ψk captures the interaction of prices within sector k or ‘within-sector
eﬀects’, and π is the variance of prices from zero. Notice that b(p) would produce Datta and
Dixon’s [2000] ‘linear-homothetic’ preferences when δ = 0, and Leontieﬀ preferences when δ = 0
and γ = 0. Validity of the unit cost function defined by (2) and (3) is shown in Appendix A.1.5
We apply Shephard’s lemma to (2): pikxik/Y = (∂b/∂pik)(pik/b) ≡ αik, hence αik is the
share of aggregate nominal expenditure going to good xik. Thus, we derive the Marshallian
demand function for the representative good:
xik =
Y
bnK

1 + γ − δ +
δ
(n− 1)
nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk
ψk
− γ pikπ

 . (4)
To begin with, we assume that n is not too small. Hence, firm Fik perceives (4) linear in
own-price, pik, and the individual prices of the goods produced by other firms in the sector,Pn
j 6=i pjk. In other words, each firm takes b, π and its sectoral-specific index ψ as given when
making optimal production decisions. In (4), it is straightforward to check that own-price
elasticity and markup vary along the linear product demand schedule, where the absolute value
of price elasticity is increasing in own-price. Let us emphasize that a novel aspect introduced
by the ‘extended linear-homothetic’ preferences is the presence of a sectoral-specific price index
in firm’s direct demand.6
5 The first version of the preferences considered a unit cost function of the form: b(p) = µ + δΨ +
γ [µ− π] . I am indebted to Huw Dixon for suggesting the normalization in (2).
6 The assumption of n not too small implies that the eﬀect of an individual price on the sectoral-
specific price index can be ignored. In the duopoly case, where n = 2, it is reasonable to think
that an individual firm would take into account the eﬀect of its strategy on ψ - such that product demand
would not be linear in price. At this stage, we abstract from this additional channel - through which
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We focus on product demand functions when symmetry in price indices is anticipated, that
is when µ = ψ1 = ψ2 = ... = ψK = Ψ = π = P and b = P . The direct demand function for the
representative good simplifies to:
xik
y =
1
nK

1 + γ − δ +
δ
(n− 1)
nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk
P − γ
pik
P

 , (5)
where y = Y/P is real aggregate expenditure. The symmetric own-price elasticity of direct
product demand is given by: |bεik| = γ, such that |bεik| > 1 ↔ γ > 1. Hence, γ characterizes
elasticity in symmetric equilibrium. The symmetric cross-price elasticity is given by: bϕjik =
(∂xik/∂pjk)(pjk/xik) = δ/(n− 1). Parameter δ captures the degree of substitutability of goods
within a sector in the sense that the cross-price elasticity increases in δ. A greater δ implies
closer substitutes.7
The inverse demand function for good xik is derived from (4). It is given by:
pik
P =
nK
(γ − δ)


1 + γ − δ
nK −
δ
γ(n− 1) + δ
nX
j=1
j 6=i
xjk
y −
(γ − δ)(n− 1) + δ
γ(n− 1) + δ
xik
y

 , (6)
where the simplifying assumption of symmetry in price indices is introduced. Notice that (6) is
perceived linear in own-output, xik, and competitors’ outputs,
Pn
j 6=i xjk, by the representative
firm. The symmetric own-price elasticity of (inverse) product demand is given by: |bεik| =
(γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ)/((γ − δ)(n− 1) + δ).8
the individual price can aﬀect product demand - and we keep linearity to confine attention to the
comparison of Bertrand and Cournot general equilibria with endogenous labor costs. The case of n small
is addressed in Section 5. Overall, aggregate-price-taking is in the spirit of the monopolistic competition
model of Dixit and Stiglitz [1977].
7 Symmetric elasticity refers to elasticity evaluated in the symmetric solution, where pik = pjk
∀i, j = 1, ..., n ,∀ k = 1, ...,K. On the other hand, notice that an increase in n would simply replicate the
Bertrand economy, hence elasticity in symmetric equilibrium is invariant to n. We could introduce n in
elasticity by assuming: γ = θf(n), where θ is an exogenous constant and f 0(·) > 0. In symmetric
equilibrium, the unit cost of utility would be still invariant to n. However, in this paper, we leave aside
the issue of the appearance of new capacity - in the form of entry in a sector (n endogenous) or,
for example, an increase in the number of sectors. Hence, we assume throughout the analysis n
and K fixed. Finally, note that γ > δ, which obtains from the elasticity condition, ensures that in
absolute terms the own-price eﬀect on product demand is greater than the sum of the cross-price eﬀects.
8 Accordingly, we obtain an implicit assumption on γ for inverse demand to be elastic, |bεik| >
1↔ γ > γC . It is applicable when product market competition is Cournot.
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Having derived the product demand functions that follow from the aggregated individual’s
optimal behavior, we turn to present how price and wage formation takes place in the econ-
omy. It occurs in two stages. In the first stage, nominal wages are agreed between bargaining
parties, unions and firms, in a number of simultaneous and independent negotiations carried
out throughout the economy. In the knowledge of their corresponding nominal wage, firms si-
multaneously set product market variables by optimizing profits - thus, firms set employment.
Previously, they have cooperatively chosen to compete in either prices or quantities. The model
is solved by backward induction.
The objective function of the representative firm is given by:
Ω ik = (pik −wik)xik. (7)
The objective function of a typical union, say Uik, is given by:
Uik =
wik
P lik − ρl
e
ik. (8)
In (8), we assume that the union cares about the total surplus of its representative worker,
that is the (expected) real wage bill minus the disutility from supplying lik units (hours) of
labor. We also assume that there is equal rationing of employment among workers, hence the
model is one of underemployment rather than unemployment. For analytical convenience the
model is solved for e = 2, this implies a constant unitary elasticity of marginal disutility with
respect to work.9
In sector k, the bargained nominal wage, wk, is the outcome of the maximization of the
sub-game perfect Nash bargaining maximand Bk:
Bk =
Ã nX
i=1
Uik
!β Ã nX
i=1
Ωik
!1−β
. (9)
9 Expression (8) is derived from the aggregated individual’s utility function in (1), once the individual
has allocated wealth between consumption and real money balances. The individual’s utility is linear in
labor income, where marginal utility of real wealth equals one. Notice that expectations are rational
since the expected price level is equal to the actual one.
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In (9), parameter β ∈ [0, 1] reflects the bargaining strength of each party. The negotiation
is carried out at the industry level, that is a single negotiation takes place in each sector over
the industry-wide wage. The disagreement payoﬀs for the sectoral union and the employers’
confederation are set equal to zero. Overall, expression (9) shows that we model centralization
following the approach in Horn and Wolinsky [1988]. Note that throughout the analysis we
impose, when necessary, the restriction of employment being the minimum of the labor demand
and the competitive labor supply.10
Due to the symmetric nature of the economy, we first solve for partial equilibrium in sec-
tor k. Then, we derive the imperfectly competitive equilibrium for the aggregate economy.
The solution of the model is straightforward. To strive for brevity, we report various partial
equilibrium results in Appendix A.2.
3. Unionized Oligopoly in General Equilibrium
3.1. Equilibrium under Bertrand Competition
Consider the scenario where firms throughout the economy cooperatively choose to compete
in prices. The price elasticity of demand for the representative good is derived from (5):11
¯¯
εBik
¯¯
=
γ
¡pik
P
¢
1 + γ − δ + δ(n−1)
nP
j 6=i
pjk
P − γ
pik
P
. (10)
The first order condition of profit optimization, pik(1−(1/
¯¯
εBik
¯¯
)) = wik, yields the following
10 In order to illustrate macroeconomic equilibrium in the right-to-manage model, we explicitly solve
the general equilibrium model under industry-wide centralization. Equally, the model can be solved
under decentralized bargaining. In this scenario, the representative Nash bargaining maximand is re-
written as: Bik = (Uik)β (Ωik)1−β . The solution of the model under decentralization is reported
in subsection 3.4 below.
11 Throughout the analysis, superscripts B and C stand for, respectively, Bertrand and Cournot
outcomes; subscripts D and IW stand for, respectively, decentralized and industry-wide bargaining.
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Bertrand-Nash price best-reply function:12
pik
P =
1
2γ

1 + γ − δ +
δ
(n− 1)
nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk
P + γ
wik
P

 . (11)
The Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, where no party has an incentive to change its strategy
taking into account the (re)actions of the other parties, is achieved at the following price:
pik
P =
γ
(2γ − δ)


1 + γ − δ
γ +
δ
2γ(n− 1) + δ
nX
j=1
j 6=i
wjk
P +
2γ(n− 1)− δ(n− 2)
2γ(n− 1) + δ
wik
P

 . (12)
From (5) and (12), we derive the expression for firm Fik’s labor demand:
xik
y =
γ
nK (2γ − δ)

1 + γ − δ +
δγ
2γ(n− 1) + δ
nX
j=1
j 6=i
wjk
P −
γ(2γ(n− 1)− δ(n− 2))− δ2
2γ(n− 1) + δ
wik
P

 .
(13)
Under industry-wide centralization, the firm’s labor demand simplifies to:
xik
y =
γ
nK (2γ − δ)
³
1 + γ − δ − (γ − δ)wkP
´
, (14)
since wik = wjk = wk ∀i, j ∈ k. The first order condition of the right-to-manage negotiation is
obtained from the maximization of (9) with respect to the nominal wage. The representative
bargaining parties anticipate expression (14). The outcome of the optimization yields firm’s
wage rule, which depends upon aggregate variables and product and labor market parameters.
The expression of the wage rule is reported in Appendix A.2.
Macroeconomic equilibrium under symmetry implies that the relative price pik/P equals one.
From the first order condition of profit optimization, we derive the equilibrium real wage:
³w
P
´B∗
= 1− 1γ . (15)
Expression (15) indicates that in macroeconomic equilibrium the bargained nominal wage
wB∗ is below the price level PB∗, hence the Bertrand firm keeps a constant markup given by:
12 Firm Fik’s choice variable is the nominal price pik, we easily write the outcome of the optimization
in terms of the relative price pik/P . Note that firm Fik’s price best-reply function is upward-sloping, this
indicates that the Bertrand game is played in strategic complements.
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λB = 1/
¯¯¯bεBik ¯¯¯ = 1/γ. From (15) and the wage rule under industry-wide centralization, it follows
that equilibrium under Bertrand competition occurs at the aggregate output and employment
level given by:13
yB∗IW =
nK
ρ
µ
1− λB − β
2
µ
1 + γ − δ
γ − δ
¶¶
. (16)
The equilibrium price level is derived from expression (16) and the macroeconomic income-
expenditure identity, y = (c/(1 − c))(Ms/P ). Similarly, by introducing the macroeconomic
income-expenditure identity and the equilibrium price level in the wage rule, we obtain the
equilibrium bargained nominal wage for every firm and union in the economy. It can be ex-
pressed as follows:
wB∗IW =
2ρcMS
nK(1− c)
Ã
(1− λB)(γ − δ)
2(1− λB)(γ − δ)− β(1 + γ − δ)
!
. (17)
Finally, equilibrium nominal profits under Bertrand competition are given by:
ΩB∗ik =
cMS
nK(1− c)γ ≡
Y
nKλ
B. (18)
Next, we consider the scenario where firms cooperatively choose to compete in quantities.
3.2. Equilibrium under Cournot Competition
Profit maximization yields the following Cournot-Nash quantity best-reply function:14
xik
y =
(γ(n− 1) + δ)
2((γ − δ)(n− 1) + δ)


1 + γ − δ
nK −
δ
γ(n− 1) + δ
nX
j=1
j 6=i
xjk
y −
γ − δ
nK
wik
P

 . (19)
The labor demand schedule under Cournot competition and industry-wide centralization is
given by:
xik
y =
(γ(n− 1) + δ)
nK(2γ(n− 1)− δ(n− 3))
³
1 + γ − δ − (γ − δ)wkP
´
. (20)
13 Note that, when necessary, we apply a lower-bound limit on γ - i.e. γ > γB where γB > 1
- to exclude negative solutions. In particular, γB is obtained by setting yB∗IW = 0 when β = 1.
We check whether γB, when applicable, is overlyrestrictive. It is straightforward to show that for
γ = γB symmetric elasticity
¯¯bεBik ¯¯ ∈ (3, 3.41) and markup λBik = 1/ ¯¯bεBik ¯¯ ∈ (0.33, 0.29) when δ = {0, 1},
respectively. In other words, when we apply γB we implicitly ask product demand elasticity to be above
3−3.41% and the markup not to exceed 29−33%. Given that we expect high product demand elasticities
when competition is oligopolistic, this does not seem overlyrestrictive.
14 The quantity best-reply function is downward-sloping, this indicates that the Cournot game is
played in strategic substitutes.
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As in the Bertrand case, we derive the wage rule. Its expression is reported in Appendix
A.2.
The real wage in macroeconomic equilibrium under quantity-setting competition takes the
following form: ³w
P
´C∗
= 1− (γ − δ)(n− 1) + δ
(γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ) , (21)
and the Cournot firm keeps a constant markup: λC = 1/
¯¯¯bεCik ¯¯¯ = ((γ − δ)(n − 1) + δ)/((γ −
δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ)).
The equilibrium level of output is obtained from (21) and the wage rule under industry-wide
centralization:15
yC∗IW =
nK
ρ
µ
1− λC − β
2
µ
1 + γ − δ
γ − δ
¶¶
. (22)
The equilibrium price level is evaluated from expression (22) and the macroeconomic income-
expenditure identity. Accordingly, the resulting bargained nominal wage can be expressed as
follows:
wC∗IW =
2ρcMS
nK(1− c)
Ã
(1− λC)(γ − δ)
2(1− λC)(γ − δ)− β(1 + γ − δ)
!
. (23)
Finally, equilibrium nominal profits under Cournot competition are given by:
ΩC∗ik =
cMS((γ − δ)(n− 1) + δ)
nK(1− c)(γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ) ≡
Y
nKλ
C . (24)
Note that, in the absence of other distortions, money is neutral in the oligopolistically
competitive economy.16 Having solved the model of unionized oligopoly in general equilibrium,
we turn to explore how equilibrium is aﬀected by alternative market structures and shocks.
3.3. Price and Quantity Competition in General Equilibrium
One of the obvious questions the above analysis poses is to what extent the two diﬀerent
types of product market competition that may govern the K diﬀerentiated oligopolies yield dif-
15 We apply a lower-bound limit on γ - i.e. γ > γC where γC > γC - to exclude negative solutions. It
is straightforward to show that this lower-bound limit, when applicable, is not overlyrestrictive (product
demand elasticity is asked to be above 3− 3.41% and the markup not to exceed 29− 33%).
16 Under Bertrand and Cournot competition, nominal variables are homogenous of degree one in MS .
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ferent aggregate outcomes. If we start from the well-known result in oligopolistic theory stating
that Bertrand competition yields higher eﬃciency, we expect that a switch from quantity-setting
to price-setting competition will bring about an outcome closer to the perfectly competitive one.
Despite the fact that it is not our objective to discuss the mechanisms that might induce firms
to switch strategy, we can still compare macroeconomic outcomes under alternative types of
competition. Results are summarized in Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 1: In general equilibrium, Cournot competition yields lower output, employ-
ment and real wage and higher price level, markup and profits than Bertrand. Accordingly, the
absolute values of product and labor demand elasticities are greater under Bertrand competition.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Figure 1 represents general equilibrium under Cournot and Bertrand competition in the
{l, w/P}-space. The product-market-determined real wage (PRW ) schedules arise from ex-
pressions (15) and (21). The labor demand schedules under Bertrand (lBik) and Cournot (lCik)
competition follow from (14) and (20), respectively. Notice that, other things unchanged, an
exogenous increase in real aggregate expenditure pivots out and flattens labor demand under
both types of product market competition. As real aggregate expenditure increases, both the
bargained nominal wage and the level of employment rise, since the union faces a trade-oﬀ
between employment and the wage. Thus, the relationship among real aggregate expenditure,
the real wage and employment is captured by the bargained-real-wage (BRW ) schedule drawn
in the {l, w/P}-space.17
17 In the model, bargained-real-wage schedules are derived from (A.2.1) under Bertrand (BRWB), and
(A.2.2) under Cournot (BRWC). Their relative location in Figures 1 and 2 is orientative. The proofs on
their slopes and shapes are reported in Appendix A.4.
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FIGURE 1. Unionized Oligopoly in General Equilibrium
Equilibrium employment occurs at the intersection of the product-market-determined real wage
schedule and the bargained-real-wage schedule, specifically lB∗ under Bertrand and lC∗ under
Cournot. Any deviation from the unique equilibrium employment rate would capture a scenario
of either accelerating or decelerating inflation, depending upon whether the economy is to the
right or to the left of equilibrium. In our analytical framework, rational expectations ensure
that no deviations are possible, hence actual employment equals equilibrium employment. Or,
in other words, real aggregate demand is always at the equilibrium employment rate.
A common feature of the bargained-real-wage schedules is their shape: as real aggregate
expenditure goes up, the opportunity cost of wage increases rises. The latter has a restraining
eﬀect in union’s demands on wages, yielding the shape of the schedules.18 The comparison of
equilibrium nominal wages across types of competition yields Proposition 2.
PROPOSITION 2: In industry-wide bargaining, the equilibrium nominal wage is higher under
Cournot than under Bertrand competition.
18 An additional aspect of ‘buoyant’ demand refers to the (potential) positive relation between the
state of aggregate demand and union’s bargaining power. In this theoretical setting, this relation
is captured as two separate eﬀects. Hence, if an exogenous increase in real aggregate expenditure
increases union’s bargaining power, then the bargained-real-wage schedule would shift upwards as
a result of the aggregate demand shock. The latter follows from (A.2.1) and (A.2.2).
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Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The result established in Proposition 2 is consistent with the predictions we find in existing
literature (see, for example, Soskice [2000], and the partial equilibrium analysis under decentral-
ization in Correa López and Naylor [forth.]). Hence, we expect that the higher wage elasticity
of labor demand under Bertrand competition produces a lower bargained nominal wage. This
is because it is more costly in terms of employment to negotiate higher wages in the face of a
Bertrand oligopoly.
The benchmark scenario we use to compare the above outcomes is established by the com-
petitive labor supply, or labor supply in short, and represented in Figure 2. The representative
worker maximizes (w/P )l − ρle, where e = 2, in order to choose l. Thus, labor supply is given
by: lS = (1/2ρ)(w/P ). The intersection of the product-market-determined real wage schedule
and the labor supply schedule yields equilibrium output (and employment) when the labor
market operates in perfect competition. Under Bertrand, this is given by:
yB = nK
2ρ
µ
1− 1γ
¶
. (25)
Accordingly, we obtain the equilibrium output (and employment) under Cournot and perfect
competition in the labor market:
yC = nK
2ρ
µ
1− (γ − δ)(n− 1) + δ
(γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ)
¶
. (26)
From the comparison of equilibrium real wages carried out in Proposition 1, it is straight-
forward to conclude that yB > yC.19
19 Note that we impose the restriction that employment is the minimum of labor supply and labor
demand. In other words, an equilibrium employment outcome occurring to the right of the labor
supply, as point B00 in Figure 2 indicates, is not compatible with either the existence of unions in
the labor markets or with the representative worker’s choice over employment. In this scenario, the
restriction applies and the labor supply binds.
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FIGURE 2. Competitive Labor Supply and the Union Employment Outcome
Next, we consider whether a unionized labor market may produce the competitive outcome.
Specifically, we find, across types of competition, combinations of parameter values - {γ, δ, n, β}
- that produce the competitive equilibrium employment outcome in the labor market. This re-
sult obtains when product and labor market parameters meet the necessary condition for the
bargained-real-wage schedule to intersect the product-market-determined real wage schedule
where the labor supply does. We might also interpret this result by stating that, given certain
product market characteristics, workers are ‘indiﬀerent’ to union wage coverage for suﬃciently
low values of β - that is where the labor supply binds.
We conclude by pointing out that: for those combinations of parameter values where the
labor supply does not bind, perfect competition in the labor market does not always yield higher
employment than imperfect competition. In other words, point B may lie in between points
C0 and B0 in Figure 2. This indicates that equilibrium output under Bertrand in the presence
of unions (lB∗) can exceed equilibrium output under Cournot in a perfectly competitive labor
market (lC).20
20 The proofs of these results are reported in Appendix A.5.
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3.4. The Role of Supply Shocks
We analyze the macroeconomic eﬀects of exogenous shocks to parameters that characterize
product and labor markets. In the spirit of Blanchard and Giavazzi [2003], product and labor
market parameters reflect the degree of (de)regulation. Results are summarized in the following
Propositions.
PROPOSITION 3: An increase in γ increases output, employment and the real wage and
reduces the price level, markup and profits. This result holds under both types of product market
competition.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
An exogenous increase in γ will increase the own-price elasticity of product demand, and
will reduce the markup of the firm. Eventually, more competition lowers the aggregate price
level and increases output and employment. In other words, at a higher γ the firm perceives
that one percent increase in its price reduces its share of aggregate expenditure by a larger
percentage. As a result, firms pursue a lower price (higher quantity) strategy in the product
market.21
The model can capture labor market reform through two direct channels: (i) the degree
of centralization in wage-setting, (ii) the distribution of bargaining power. We bear in mind
that the model does not capture the conditions under which labor market deregulation may
bring about more competition in the product market - that is the equilibrium real wage is
not a function of labor market parameters. Thus, deregulation in the labor market induces
a change in equilibrium employment due to, exclusively, a shift of the bargained-real-wage
schedule. Note, however, that the model captures the conditions under which product market
21 The price elasticity of the individual good’s share of aggregate nominal expenditure is given, in
symmetric equilibrium, by: bξik = ∂αik∂pik pikαik = 1 − γ < 0, hence ∂bξik/∂γ = −1. On the other hand,
note that the eﬀect of a shock to parameter δ is explored in Section 4, where n is small and the
assumption of sectoral-price taking is relaxed. In this scenario, parameter δ also aﬀects the own-
price elasticity of direct demand.
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deregulation, by increasing the (absolute value of) labor demand elasticities, induces a more
competitive outcome in the labor market. First, we report the solutions of the model when
bargaining is decentralized. In price-setting competition, we derive the following expression for
equilibrium output (and employment):
yB∗D =
nK
ρ
µ
1− λB − β
2
µ
(1 + γ − δ)(2γ(n− 1) + δ) + δ(n− 1)(γ − 1)
γ(2γ(n− 1)− δ(n− 2))− δ2
¶¶
. (27)
Correspondingly, in quantity-setting competition:
yC∗D =
nK
ρ
µ
1− λC − β
2
µ
(1 + γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ)A− δ(n− 1)(A+ δ)
(γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ)A
¶¶
, (28)
where A = 2γ(n− 1)− δ(n− 2). The predictions of the model in terms of the macroeconomic
eﬀects of labor market-related shocks are summarized next.
PROPOSITION 4. (i) A decentralized wage bargaining system yields higher equilibrium employ-
ment than industry-wide centralization; (ii) An increase in β reduces output and employment
and increases the price level - the real wage, markup and profits are not altered. Results (i) and
(ii) hold under both types of product market competition.
Proof. See Appendix B.2 for part (i). Part (ii) is easily inferred from the expressions in
general equilibrium.
A wage bargaining system centralized at the sectoral level, which emerges from the coor-
dinating activities of unions and firms, reduces equilibrium employment. The labor demand
elasticity eﬀect is smaller when the negotiation occurs over the sectoral wage.22 This has the
eﬀect of increasing the bargained real wage for all levels of employment, hence reducing equi-
librium employment. Thus, we capture one of the aspects of the Calmfors and Driﬃll’s [1988]
argument - namely, an intermediately centralized wage bargaining system produces a higher
equilibrium rate of unemployment compared to a decentralized system.
22 The labor demand elasticity eﬀect captures the extent of the employment loss induced by a wage in-
crease. It is perceived as a (proportional) marginal cost by the union in the right-to-manage negotiation.
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An increase in β can be graphically represented as a shift upwards, for all levels of employ-
ment, of the bargained-real-wage schedules depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Therefore, for a given
level of real aggregate expenditure - that is for a certain labor demand schedule - higher union
bargaining power increases the bargained real wage. Since the bargained real wage is above the
product-market-determined real wage, that is marginal cost is above marginal revenue from the
firm’s point of view, firms adjust by reducing output and increasing prices. The latter is subse-
quently translated into an increase in the price level, a reduction in real aggregate expenditure
and, hence, an inward-shifted labor demand schedule. The process continues until the new
equilibrium is reached, where the new bargained-real-wage schedule intersects the unchanged
product-market-determined real wage schedule. Notice that rational expectations imply an
instantaneous adjustment to the new equilibrium.
Overall, an increase in union bargaining power reduces equilibrium employment and output.
In dynamic terms, we would argue that, in the event of a permanent shock that increases β,
real aggregate expenditure falls in order to stabilize inflation at a higher rate, where equilibrium
unemployment has also increased. Thus, the predictions of the model are consistent with earlier
literature (see, for example, Layard, Nickell and Jackman [1991]). Finally, note that an increase
in worker’s marginal disutility from work (parameter ρ increases) reduces equilibrium output
and increases the price level under price and quantity competition.
Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to, respectively, an extension of the basic model - where
we consider the strategic interactions that may occur among firms, unions and the monetary
authority - and an application of the model to explain a topical issue - namely, the (joint)
performance of the labor share and the unemployment rate in Continental Europe over the
1990s.
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4. Extension: Unionized Oligopoly and Monetary Policy
We present an alternative channel for the development of strategic interactions among firms,
unions and the monetary authority. This channel creates a transmission mechanism for the
existence of real eﬀects of monetary policy-related shocks. The basic message conveyed in this
transmission mechanism is straightforward: as long as firms and unions care about the sectoral
price eﬀects of their individual pricing strategies and as long as the central bank monitors
sectoral price indices when conducting monetary policy, real eﬀects might be expected from a
change in either the type of institution conducting monetary policy or the specific monetary
rule it adheres to. Let us point out that our approach does not challenge the money neutrality
thesis: changes in nominal money supply do not have real eﬀects. Thus, this section explores
a path opened by the general equilibrium model developed above.
Perhaps a more accurate description of the economy would allow for a large number of
sectors with a relatively small number of firms operating in each. For n small, it is reasonable
to think that an individual firm would take into account the eﬀect of its product market strategy
on the sectoral-specific price index ψ, which in turn aﬀects product demand. In this scenario,
the direct demand function perceived by the firm is re-written as follows:
xik =
cMS
nK(1− c)P

1 + γ − δ +
δ
(n− 1)
nX
j=1
j 6=i
pjk
ψk
− γ pikP

 , (29)
where the income-expenditure identity is already introduced, and symmetry in aggregate price
indices is anticipated. In (29), we observe that product demand is not linear in own-price, since
ψk depends upon pik. However, since K is large, the assumptions of aggregate-price-taking and
aggregate-income-taking at partial equilibrium are not violated.
Prior to wage and price formation, we introduce a stage of the game where the monetary
authority (credibly) precommits to a monetary rule described by parameter φ. We consider
two alternative monetary regimes under which the economy may be functioning: a domestic
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central bank (DCB) regime; a monetary union (MU) regime. In each monetary regime, the
domestic money supply MS is given by:
MSDCB =
Ã KX
k=1
αkψk
!φ
; MSMU =


KP
k=1
αkψk +
KP
k=1
α∗kψ
∗
k
2


φ
; where − 1 ≤ φ ≤ 1. (30)
Parameter αk represents the share of aggregate expenditure allocated to sector k by the
(aggregated) individual. Accordingly, α∗k and ψ
∗
k capture foreign country variables, such that
the domestic and foreign countries are assumed of equal size. In (30), we assume that the
monetary authority is sensitive to a weighted average of sectoral price indices - domestic and
foreign (when relevant) - in setting nominal money supply. A monetary authority sensitive to
sectoral price indices is not new to the monetary policy-making literature (see, more recently,
Mankiw and Reis [2003]).
Regarding the monetary rule: for φ > 0, the central bank accommodates any price increase
through an expansion of the nominal money supply, such that φ = 1 delivers full accommoda-
tion. For φ < 0, the central bank reduces nominal money in response to a price increase. The
limiting case occurs at φ = −1 where we capture full monetary contraction (tightening) - that
is, the fall in MS is of identical size to the increase in, say, ψk once the central bank accounts
for the weight of ψk inMS. For φ = 0, the nominal money supply is fixed and equal to 1, hence
we assume exogenous MS.23 Note that, at the start of the game, the monetary authority is
endowed with a certain value of φ as a result of past reputation-building.
To make our point on the existence of real eﬀects of monetary institution and monetary rule,
we derive from (29) the own-price elasticity of demand in symmetric equilibrium. To strive for
23 The choice of 1 owes to analytical simplicity. Instead, we could introduce parameter m, and
changes in m would capture exogenous changes in nominal money supply that would be present for any
φ-value. In the cross-country symmetric solution, where all individual prices (domestic and foreign) are
identical and equal to P , the specifications above amount to Soskice and Iversen’s [2000] where MS =
Pα. The diﬀerence being that Soskice and Iversen [2000] do not consider the possibility of nominal
contraction, that is α ∈ [0, 1]. Evidence suggesting nominal tightening from the monetary authority
in response to excessive wage agreements has commonly pointed out to the German Bundesbank.
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simplicity, we assume price-setting competition in each oligopoly and cross-country symmetry.
Note that the firm, when it optimizes profits, takes into account the eﬀect of its price strategy
on its corresponding sectoral price index. In the knowledge of the structure of money supply
given by (30), this implies that the firm internalizes the eﬀect of its price strategy on MS,
which in turn aﬀects product demand. This eﬀect depends upon parameter φ and the existing
monetary regime, and acts as a link between the productive side of the economy and monetary
policy.
Thus, the own-price elasticity under alternative monetary regimes is given by:
|bεik|DCB = γ + δn − φnK ; |bεik|MU = γ + δn − φ2nK ; (31)
where |bεik| increases in the degree of substitutability δ. The second term in price elasticity
depends upon n: a larger n implies a smaller impact of firm Fik’s price on the sectoral price
index ψk, thus a smaller reduction in xik after an increase in pik.
There are two major implications that follow from (31):
• Elasticity in symmetric general equilibrium depends upon the monetary rule - this holds
across monetary institutions. For φ < 0, firms perceive a more elastic product demand.
This is because nominal tightening implies that any individual price increase is followed
by a reduction in MS , hence in product demand. For φ > 0, firms perceive a less elastic
product demand, since individual price increases expand product demand through the
expansion of nominal money. Hence, the character of the monetary rule - accommodating
vis-à-vis tightening - has real eﬀects: it determines whether the firm will have an incentive
to follow a lower or a higher price strategy than otherwise.24 Note that, the larger nK
the smaller the individual price eﬀect on nominal money supply.
• The macroeconomic eﬀects of the establishment of a monetary union depend upon the
character of the monetary rule.25 For φ > 0, firms perceive a more elastic product demand
24 By ‘otherwise’ we mean the scenario of exogenous MS , captured by φ = 0, and solved in Section 3.
25 In an attempt to isolate the eﬀects of the formation of a monetary union, we assume that no
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when the monetary union is formed. In a monetary union, the (domestic) monetary
expansion that follows after an individual ‘domestic’ price increase is reduced, due to
the fact that the monetary authority reacts now to individual prices across the monetary
union. In other words, an individual price has a smaller impact on monetary policy.
For φ < 0, firms perceive a less elastic product demand when the monetary union is
formed. In a monetary union, the (domestic) monetary contraction that follows after an
individual ‘domestic’ price increase is reduced, since an individual price has a smaller
impact on monetary policy. Thus, the establishment of a monetary union, by altering the
incentives of firms towards price formation, will have real eﬀects. The sign and extent of
these eﬀects will depend upon the character and the specific value of the monetary rule.
The above sketch of the extended model has helped to construct our argument. In fact, if
the labor market is perfectly competitive, we arrive to the following expressions for equilibrium
output (and employment) across monetary regimes:
yBDCB =
nK
2ρ
Ã
1− 1
γ + δn −
φ
nK
!
; yBMU =
nK
2ρ
Ã
1− 1
γ + δn −
φ
2nK
!
. (32)
In (32), we find that a switch from accommodation to tightening increases equilibrium
employment. Also, if the monetary authority reduces the money supply in response to price
increases, the formation of a monetary union may have a negative impact on employment. On
the other hand, note that an increase in the degree of product substitutability, δ, induces a
more eﬃcient outcome in general equilibrium.
However, in order to provide a full account of the real eﬀects of the monetary factors ad-
dressed here, we need to introduce imperfect competition in the labor market. For n small,
we anticipate that wage bargaining agents who behave strategically would also internalize the
eﬀect of their wage-setting strategies on the sectoral-specific price index (hence on MS and
structural parameter or objective function is altered with its formation. Although simplistic, this
is a common assumption in the literature (see, for example, Cukierman and Lippi [2001]).
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on labor demand). Thus, the evaluation of the output and employment eﬀects of shocks to
monetary policy factors should take into account the interactions among: (i) monetary pol-
icy rule (character and value of φ), (ii) monetary institution (domestic central bank vis-à-vis
monetary union), (iii) degree of competition in oligopolistic markets (proxied by γ), and (iv)
degree of competition in labor markets (proxied by β). Finally, in (31) we note that perfect
competition in product markets (γ →∞) yields neutrality of both monetary rule and monetary
institution.26
5. Application: A Discussion on European Performance
We conclude with an informal and brief discussion on the predictions of the model regarding
the performance of the unemployment rate and of the labor share in Continental Europe over
the 1990s. Blanchard and Giavazzi [2003] report a dramatic fall of the labor share in Continental
Europe in the early to mid-1980s, matched by increasing unemployment. During the 1990s,
the labor share (proxied by the real wage) has recorded a milder but steady fall. Meanwhile,
the unemployment rate has persisted high - with a respite in the late 1990s, when it started to
fall.27
In their explanation on the joint evolution of the labor share and the unemployment rate
in Continental Europe since the early 1980s, Blanchard and Giavazzi [2003] place emphasis
on two outcomes that may accompany product and labor market deregulation: the (initial)
redistribution of rents among economic players (workers and firms), and its subsequent dynamic
eﬀects - when further redistribution takes place. Their key contribution is to show that a
decrease in workers’ bargaining power reduces the real wage in the short-run, with the potential
26 The analytical solution of the extended model under industry-wide bargaining can be found in
Correa López [2004], where we explore the output and employment eﬀects induced by shocks to the
monetary rule and the monetary regime.
27 The decline of the labor share over the 1990s averages about 3 per cent for the four large Continental
European economies - Germany, France, Italy and Spain. For country-specific evidence, see Blanchard
and Giavazzi [2003].
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benefit of a fall in unemployment and an unchanged (pre-shock) real wage in the long-run.28
Furthermore, by assuming concave utility for workers - that is an upward-sloping contract
curve - labor market deregulation yields a lower real wage and increased unemployment in
the short-run, in exchange for lower unemployment and an unchanged real wage in the long-
run. Blanchard and Giavazzi [2003] argue that the recent evolution of the labor share and of
the unemployment rate recorded in Continental Europe may be the result of the decline in
unions’ bargaining power experienced over the 1980s. Their theoretical setting supports this
argument if the eﬀects of the decline in workers’ bargaining power (as a result of labor market
deregulation policies) dominate the eﬀects of the decline in the markup (as a result of product
market deregulation policies).
In our model wages are allocative and the equilibrium real wage mirrors the markup, hence
the discussion that follows is necessarily diﬀerent to the one presented in Blanchard and Giavazzi
[2003]. Suppose that some of the eﬀects associated to product and labor market deregulation in
Europe over the 1990s are captured by: (i) increases in product demand elasticities (component
γ in elasticity increases), (ii) falling union bargaining power (β decreasing) , (iii) a shift to a
decentralized wage bargaining system. A casual look at the evidence suggests that the afore-
mentioned deregulatory moves may not have had the expected employment-enhancing eﬀects.
Furthermore, they do not explain the evolution of the labor share.
The model identifies another factor - namely, the degree of product substitutability - whose
evolution may have played a role in the steady decline of the labor share and in the persistence
of high unemployment in Continental Europe over the 1990s. Specifically, let us consider that
firms, in an attempt to oﬀset the pressure of integration on the markup, have placed more
eﬀort on diﬀerentiating their products (δ decreases due to, for example, increased advertising
28 Note that Blanchard and Giavazzi’s [2003] results crucially depend upon the assumption of eﬃcient
bargaining in the labor market. They show that their main prediction breaks down when bargaining is
described by the right-to-manage model, since there is no intertemporal trade-oﬀ emerging from a
decline in workers’ bargaining power.
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budgets and more aggressive marketing). The latter, in turn, may discourage entry by making
it more ‘costly’ (see a related discussion in Solow [1998]). In (31), we observe that a fall in δ
reduces the price elasticity of direct product demand - which, in turn, reduces the real wage
(labor share) and increases unemployment. Note that, in order to explain the evolution of the
labor share, the eﬀect on the markup of a lower degree of product substitutability must have
dominated the eﬀect of a higher γ as a result of product market deregulation.29
We finish by emphasizing that the actual relevance of the aforementioned factors in explain-
ing European performance is a matter of empirical assessment. Furthermore, the evolution
of other factors need also be taken on board - such as technological ones and the monetary
factors identified in Section 4. In fact, we anticipate that monetary factors might create a
transmission mechanism of product and labor market deregulation in a monetary union. That
is, if the union-wide central bank designs its optimal monetary policy rule (φ∗ in our setting)
by considering the structural characteristics of product and labor markets of countries across
the union, we may find that a country embarked on a deregulatory path influences, through
its eﬀect on φ∗, the macroeconomic performance of a second country. This eﬀect would be
particularly noticeable if the country deregulating is one of the large economies in the union.
6. Conclusion
This paper has introduced a tractable model of unionized oligopoly in general equilibrium.
By adopting the dual approach to model consumer choice, we developed a theoretical framework
able to embed in general equilibrium the strategic interactions that may take place among
firms in oligopolistic markets and firms and unions in labor markets. The aim was to explore
the macroeconomic eﬀects of a variety of characteristics that may govern the oligopolistically
29 An additional aspect relevant to the degree of competition refers to the pace of the appearance of new
sectors in the economy (K increasing). New sectors imply new goods potentially able to win part of the
share of aggregate expenditure going to existing goods (recall that αik = 1/(nK) in equilibrium). One
may argue that the introduction of these new sectors has been relatively slow in Europe over the 1990s.
Note that the model, as it stands, is not ready to evaluate the dynamics of the appearance of new sectors.
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competitive and unionized economy.
The model produced some of the standard results we find in the literature of imperfectly
competitive macroeconomics: the ineﬃciency of the oligopolistically competitive equilibrium
and money neutrality. It also yielded a variety of other results. These include: the positive
employment eﬀect of moving from quantity-setting to price-setting competition, and the finding
that perfect competition in the labor market does not always yield higher equilibrium employ-
ment compared to imperfect competition - that is, equilibrium employment under Bertrand in
the presence of unions can exceed equilibrium employment under Cournot in a perfectly com-
petitive labor market. Hence, under certain product and labor market conditions, we may find
that a unionized economy with price-setting firms may outperform a nonunionized one with
quantity-setting firms. In addition, we concluded that unionization may produce the competi-
tive outcome in the labor market. Thus, there is a threshold value of union bargaining power
at which workers are indiﬀerent between union wage coverage and the outcome delivered by
the competitive labor supply. The exact threshold value of union power depends upon product
market characteristics: a more elastic product demand implies a higher threshold value. A
corollary of this result is to argue that the more competitive product markets are, the more
diﬃcult is for unions to survive - unless they take up other roles apart from wage bargaining
coverage. Overall, the above results seem to give support to the notion - as in Blanchard and
Giavazzi [2003] - that deregulation should start from the product market. To the extent that
the outcome of the wage negotiation is located on the labor demand schedule, a by-product of
deregulating the product market is a more competitive outcome in the labor market.
The micro foundations of the model oﬀered an alternative transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy. This transmission mechanism operates via sectoral price indices. Specifically, we
argued that, as long as firms and unions care about the inflationary ‘signals’ their sector is
sending to consumers and as long as the central bank is responsive to sectoral inflation, real
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eﬀects may be present from a change in either the type of institution conducting monetary
policy or the specific monetary rule it adheres to. Finally, we informally applied the model to
explain a topical issue: the (joint) performance of the labor share and the unemployment rate
in Continental Europe over the 1990s. This application had in mind the recent deregulatory
path embarked on by several Continental European economies. We conclude by pointing out
that macroeconomic performance may be explained, to a significant extent, by the joint evolu-
tion of a wide array of factors: from ‘productive side’ factors - such as the degree of product
substitutability and the distribution of bargaining power in the labor market - to ‘monetary
policy’ factors - such as the monetary policy rule and the type of monetary institution.
There are a number of directions for further research. These include: (i) to explore the ef-
fects of capital stock and productivity changes in general equilibrium with unionized oligopoly;
(ii) to evaluate the macroeconomic impact of alternative bargaining structures, such as eﬃcient
bargaining, and of ‘within-sector’ asymmetries, such as partial unionization; and (iii) to inves-
tigate trade-related issues, where strategic interactions among domestic and foreign economic
agents occur.
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Appendix
A.1. Validity of the expenditure and unit cost functions
The domain of function b(p) is defined by S ≡ {p ∈ <nk+ : pik > 0, i = 1, ..., n, k = 1, ...,K}.
We check that b(p) exhibits the suﬃcient properties: (i) Non-negative and non-decreasing in
prices; (ii) Homogeneity of degree one and concavity in p; (iii) Continuous diﬀerentiability. As
Datta and Dixon [2000] emphasize, property (iii) is not necessary for validity but for the ap-
plication of Shephard’s lemma. Given K large, n ≥ 2, γ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1], it is straightforward
to conclude that b(p) is continuously diﬀerentiable and homogeneous of degree one.
Concavity in p is proven by checking that b1(p) and b2(p) are concave, where b1(p) = (1−
δ)µ+γ[µ−π] and b2(p) = δΨ. Specifically, concavity of b1(p) implies that ϕb1(ep)+(1−ϕ)b1(p) 6
b1(ϕep + (1 − ϕ)p) where 0 < ϕ < 1 and {ep, p} ∈ S. In order to assess the concavity of b2(p)
we start by checking the concavity of the representative sectoral price index ψk, whose domain
sk : sk ⊂ S is defined by sk ≡ {pk ∈ <n+ : pik > 0, i = 1, ..., n}. Denote Hψk as the Hessian
matrix associated to ψk. Hence, given a n-size sector k, where n ≥ 2, it is straightforward to
check that all principal minors of Hψk exhibit the following signs:
¯¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯¯
< 0 for m odd and
m < n,
¯¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯¯
> 0 for m even and m < n and
¯¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯¯
= 0 for m = n (i.e. when
¯¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯¯
=
¯¯
Hψk
¯¯
).
More specifically, for m < n, the leading principal minors can be expressed as follows:
¯¯
Hψkm
¯¯
=
(−1)m
(n− 1)m+1 nm+1 ψm+2k
[−n(m− 1)(n− 1)ψ2k− (A.1.1)
(m− 2)




nX
j=1
j 6=1
pjk


2
+


nX
j=1
j 6=2
pjk


2
+ ...+


nX
j=1
j 6=m
pjk


2
+
2 (
nX
j=1
j 6=1
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=2
pjk +
nX
j=1
j 6=1
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=3
pjk + ...+
nX
j=1
j 6=1
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=m
pjk +
nX
j=1
j 6=2
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=3
pjk+
nX
j=1
j 6=2
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=4
pjk + ...+
nX
j=1
j 6=2
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=m
pjk + ...+
nX
j=1
j 6=(m−1)
pjk
nX
j=1
j 6=m
pjk) ],
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such that the long term in brackets in (A.1.1) equals zero for m = n. Overall, we conclude
that the Hessian matrix associated to ψk is negative semidefinite, hence ψk is concave. Note
that the sectoral price indices - {ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψK} - have the same functional form as ψk in their
corresponding subset of S. Thus, they are also characterized by negative semidefinite Hessian
matrices whose principal minors exhibit the pattern of signs described above.
Finally, given Ψ = (
PK
k=1 ψk)/K, the Hessian matrix associated to Ψ is given by:
HΨ =


Hψ1 0 0 ... 0
0 Hψ2 0 ... 0
0 0 Hψ3 ... 0
... ... ... ... ...
0 0 0 ... HψK


, (A.1.2)
where the positive constant term (1/K) is omitted for simplicity. The Hessian matrix HΨ is
nK×nK, where 0 stands for a n×n null matrix. From the structure of (A.1.2) and the analysis
of Hψk it can be shown that HΨ is negative semidefinite, more particularly, all its principal
minors exhibit the following signs:
¯¯
HΨm
¯¯
≤ 0 for m odd and m < nk,
¯¯
HΨm
¯¯
≥ 0 for m even
and m < nk and
¯¯
HΨm
¯¯
= 0 for m = nk (i.e. where
¯¯
HΨm
¯¯
=
¯¯
HΨ
¯¯
). Overall, we can conclude
that Ψ and, hence, b2(p) are concave.
Given the domain defined by S, property (i) is re-written such that b(p) has to be positive
and non-decreasing in prices. Property (i) implies that demands are non-negative; it also
implies that an additional unit of utility is costly. This property is met given the nature of
firms operating in imperfectly competitive markets. Oligopolistic firms competing in substitutes
will not, in general, find profitable to set a price above the choke-oﬀ price such that demands
become negative. Finally, from the analysis derived above we note that the expenditure function
is homothetic.
A.2. Partial Equilibrium Outcomes
Under price-setting competition and industry-wide centralization, the wage rule is given
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by: ³wk
P
´B
IW
=
(1 + γ − δ)
2(γ − δ)
µ
2ργ(γ − δ) y + β nK(2γ − δ)
ργ(γ − δ) y + nK(2γ − δ)
¶
. (A.2.1)
Accordingly, the wage rule when competition is Cournot is given by:
³wk
P
´C
IW
=
(1 + γ − δ)
2(γ − δ)
µ
2ρ(γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ) y + β nK(2γ(n− 1)− δ(n− 3))
ρ(γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ)y + nK(2γ(n− 1)− δ(n− 3))
¶
. (A.2.2)
A.3. Proof of Proposition 1
Real wage: the comparison of (15) and (21) yields (w/P )B∗ > (w/P )C∗ ↔ −δ2 < 0, which
holds ∀δ : δ ∈ (0, 1]. The latter, together with the first order condition of profit optimization,
yields the conclusion on the markups, such that λC > λB , and on the product (and labor)
demand elasticities. Output: we compare (16) and (22), since λC > λB it follows that yB∗IW >
yC∗IW . The result on the price level is derived from the output comparison together with the
macroeconomic income-expenditure identity, y = (c/(1 − c))(Ms/P ). Nominal profits: we
compare (18) and (24), since λC > λB it follows that ΩC∗ik > ΩB∗ik .
Proof of Proposition 2
Equilibrium nominal wages: we compare (17) and (23), such that wC∗IW > wB∗IW ↔ βδ
2(1 +
γ − δ) > 0, which holds for γ > 1, δ ∈ (0, 1] and β ∈ (0, 1]. Note that β = 0 yields identical
nominal wages - however, the labor supply binds.
A.4. The slope and shape of the bargained-real-wage schedules
From expressions (A.2.1) and (A.2.2), we evaluate the derivative of the corresponding wage
rule with respect to real aggregate expenditure:
∂(wkP )BIW
∂y =
nKργ(1 + γ − δ)(2γ − δ)(2− β)
2(ργ(γ − δ)y + nK(2γ − δ))2 ;
∂(wkP )CIW
∂y =
nKρ(1 + γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ)(2γ(n− 1)− δ(n− 3))(2− β)
2(ρ(γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ)y + nK(2γ(n− 1)− δ(n− 3)))2 ;
which are strictly positive for n ≥ 2, γ > 1, δ ∈ (0, 1], ρ > 0 and β ∈ [0, 1]. It is straightforward
to conclude that the second order derivatives with respect to y are strictly negative, yielding
the shape of the BRW schedules.
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A.5. Showing that lB = lB∗IW for certain combinations of parameter values
We compare (16) and (25) - divided by nK: lB = lB∗IW requires (γ−δ)(γ−1)−γβ(1+γ−δ) =
0. This holds for the following combinations of {γ, δ, β} values: eβBIW = (γ − δ)(γ − 1)/(γ(1 +
γ − δ)), where 0 < eβBIW < 1 for γ > 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, it is straightforward to conclude
that, given {γ, δ}, β = eβBIW yields lB = lB∗IW , any β > eβBIW yields lB > lB∗IW , and any β < eβBIW
yields lB < lB∗IW . In the latter scenario, the restriction applies and the labor supply binds.
Showing that lC = lC∗IW for certain combinations of parameter values
We compare (22) and (26) - divided by nK: lC = lC∗IW requires (1 − λ
C) − β((1 + γ −
δ)/(γ − δ)) = 0. This holds for the following combinations of {γ, δ, n, β} values: eβCIW =
(1 − λC)(γ − δ)/(1 + γ − δ), where 0 < eβCIW < 1 for n ≥ 2, γ > 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, it is
straightforward to conclude that, given {γ, δ, n}, β = eβCIW yields lC = lC∗IW , any β > eβCIW yields
lC > lC∗IW , and any β < eβCIW yields lC < lC∗IW . In the latter scenario, the restriction applies and
the labor supply binds.
Showing that lB∗IW > lC for certain combinations of parameter values
We compare (16) and (26) - divided by nK: lB∗IW = lC implies that (γ − δ)(γ − 1)(γ(n −
1) + δ) + δ2 − βγ(1 + γ − δ)(γ(n − 1) + δ) = 0, which holds for the following combinations of
{γ, δ, n, β} values:
βIW =
(γ − δ)(γ − 1)(γ(n− 1) + δ) + δ2
γ(1 + γ − δ)(γ(n− 1) + δ) ,
where 0 < βIW < 1 for n ≥ 2, γ > 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1]. This implies that, given {γ, δ, n},β = βIW
yields lB∗IW = lC . We check that for those combinations of parameter values captured by
β = βIW , where lB∗IW = lC , the labor supply does not bind. This requires to show that
βIW > eβBIW . Specifically, we find that βIW > eβBIW ↔ δ2 > 0, which holds ∀δ. Overall, it is
straightforward to conclude that, given {γ, δ, n, β}, βIW < β ≤ 1 yields lB∗IW < lC , β = βIW
yields lB∗IW = lC , and eβBIW < β < βIW yields lB∗IW > lC .
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B.1. Proof of Proposition 3
Price-setting competition: in (15), we observe that the real wage (markup) increases (de-
creases) in γ. The derivative of equilibrium output with respect to γ is given by:
∂yB∗IW
∂γ =
nK
ρ
µ
1
γ2 +
β
2(γ − δ)2
¶
,
which is positive for n ≥ 2, γ > 1, δ ∈ (0, 1], ρ > 0 and β ∈ [0, 1]. The result on equilibrium
output, together with the macroeconomic income-expenditure identity, yields the sign of the
eﬀect of γ on the price level. Finally, nominal profits fall as γ increases, since λB decreases in
γ. Quantity-setting competition: from (21), it follows that the markup (real wage) decreases
(increases) in γ since
∂λC
∂γ = −
1
n
µ
1
(γ − δ)2 +
(n− 1)3
(γ(n− 1) + δ)2
¶
< 0
for n ≥ 2, γ > 1 and δ ∈ (0, 1]. The derivative of equilibrium output with respect to γ is given
by:
∂yC∗IW
∂γ =
nK
ρ
Ã
−∂λ
C
∂γ +
β
2(γ − δ)2
!
,
which is positive for n ≥ 2, γ > 1, δ ∈ (0, 1], ρ > 0 and β ∈ [0, 1]. Once again, the result on
equilibrium output together with the macroeconomic identity, yields the sign of the eﬀect of γ
on the price level. Finally, Cournot profits fall as γ increases, since λC decreases in γ.
B.2. Proof of Proposition 4
Price-setting competition: we compare (27) and (16). Specifically, yB∗D > yB∗IW ↔ βδ(n −
1)(2γ− δ)/(2(γ− δ)(γ(2γ(n− 1)− δ(n− 2))− δ2)) > 0, which holds for n ≥ 2, γ > 1, δ ∈ (0, 1]
and β ∈ (0, 1]. Note that β = 0 yields identical employment outcomes. Quantity-setting
competition: we compare (28) and (22), such that yC∗D > yC∗IW ↔ βδ(n − 1)2(2γ − δ)/(2(γ −
δ)(γ(n−1)+δ)(2γ(n−1)−δ(n−2))) > 0, which holds for n ≥ 2, γ > 1, δ ∈ (0, 1] and β ∈ (0, 1].
Once again, β = 0 yields identical employment outcomes.
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